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Abstract
Security evaluation according to ISO 15408 (Common
Criteria) is a resource and time demanding activity, as well
as being costly. For this reason, only few companies take
their products through a Common Criteria evaluation. To
support security evaluation, the European Telecommunica-
tions Standards Institute (ETSI) has developed a threat, vul-
nerability, risk analysis (eTVRA) method for the Telecom-
munication (Telco) domain. eTVRA builds on the security
risk management methodology CORAS and is structured in
such a way that it provides output that can be directly fed
into a Common Criteria security evaluation.
In this paper, we evaluate the time and resource effi-
ciency of parts of eTVRA and the quality of the result pro-
duced by following eTVRA compared to a more pragmatic
approach (Protection Profile-based checklists). We use both
approaches to identify and analyze risks of a new SIM
card currently under joint development by a small hardware
company and a large Telco provider.
1. Introduction
ISO 15408:2007 Common Criteria for Information Tech-
nology Security Evaluation [10], here referred to as the
Common Criteria, is tailored for industrial purposes and
is the result of the experience and recommendations of re-
searchers and experienced developers both within the mil-
itary sector and from industry. Common Criteria evaluates
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the security level of IT products using a hierarchy of prede-
fined evaluation classes called Evaluation Assurance Levels
(EAL). There are seven such EALs, where EAL 7 provides
highest assurance. The EALs and associated guidelines take
an evaluator through a well-formulated and structured pro-
cess of assessing the security of specific parts of (or the
complete) IT product to gain confidence in the security con-
trols of the system.
Common Criteria security evaluation is considered a
healthy approach for tackling the security issues of an IT
product, as it gives detailed guidelines about the procedure
to carry it on and it describes the activities that develop-
ers and security experts involved (e.g. evaluator) should
undertake to ensure that all relevant security aspects have
been addressed. However, a Common Criteria security eval-
uation is both costly and time and resource demanding.
Hence, not many companies set aside budget and time to
take their IT products through such a formal evaluation pro-
cess. Furthermore, the security guidelines are not easily ac-
cessible for non-security experts (and security experts are
a scarce resource). For this reason, the Telecoms & Inter-
net converged Services & Protocols for Advanced Networks
(TISPAN) program at European Telecommunications Stan-
dards Institute (ETSI), a major European Telecommunica-
tion (Telco) standardization organization with world-wide
influence, developed a threat, vulnerability, risk analysis
(eTVRA) method to support Telco companies in a Common
Criteria security evaluation. eTVRA builds on CORAS [11]
and is structured to provide output that can be directly fed
into a security evaluation thus easing the evaluation process.
In this paper we evaluate eTVRA by comparing it to
a more pragmatic approach based on Protection Profile
checklists. We perform the comparison in terms of time,
resource efficiency and quality of the results. We also eval-
uate the efficiency of eTVRA in a value-web context, to
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identify and analyze risks of a new SIM card currently un-
der development in collaboration between a small hardware
company and a large Telco provider. The goal for the new
SIM card is to comply with EAL 4 or 4+ according to Com-
mon Criteria. Finally, we report on lessons learnt from ap-
plying an extended version of eTVRA. Based on experience
from earlier assessments at ETSI [18], we extended eTVRA
by adding to it a sub-process of the CORAS methodology
to compensate the fact that eTVRA does not include context
identification activities. Context identification is critical to
produce precise risk assessment results.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we
provide background information on CORAS, eTVRA and
value-webs. In Section 3 we give the industrial context.
In Section 4 we describe the methodology that we used
to identify and analyze risks to the new SIM technology.
In Section 5 we present the pragmatic approach based on
checklists, and in Section 6 we compare it with the extended
eTVRA methodology. In Section 7 we draw the lessons
learned by using eTVRA in a value-web context. Finally,
in Section 8 we conclude the paper and give directions for
future work.
Figure 1. The five main components of the
CORAS framework.
2. Background information
2.1. CORAS
CORAS [11] is a framework for model-based risk as-
sessment of security critical systems. It consists of four
main components as shown in Figure 1: (1) a risk documen-
tation framework based on RM-ODP [1]; (2) a risk manage-
ment process based on the AS/NZS 4360 [14]; (3) an inte-
grated risk management and system development process
based on the Unified Process [13] and (4) a platform for
tool inclusion based on data-integration using XML. [11]
Figure 2. CORAS sub-processes
The CORAS framework is model-based in the sense that
it gives detailed recommendations for modeling both the
system and the risk, as well as security controls identi-
fied during the risk assessment using UML. Furthermore,
CORAS is asset-driven, which means that the identification
of assets is the driving task of the risk assessment process
[11].
The CORAS risk management process comprises five
sequential risk assessment sub-processes and two manage-
ment sub-processes running in parallel (see Fig. 2).
2.2. eTVRA
Threat, Vulnerability and Risk Assessment (eTVRA)
[16] is based on component 2 of CORAS and refines the
risk management process developed by ETSI for risk as-
sessment of Telco standardization projects.
The process of eTVRA consists of 7 steps [17]:
1. Identify security objectives
2. Identify security requirements
3. Inventory of assets
4. Identification and classification of vulnerabilities,
threats and unwanted incidents
5. Quantifying the occurrence likelihood and impact of
threats
6. Establishment of risk
7. Identification of countermeasures framework
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eTVRA aims at analyzing the threats, identifying the
best set of countermeasures and reduce the overall risk. The
process starts with identification of the security objectives
of a system or a system component, out of which security
requirements are extracted. Later an inventory of the assets
in the system is drafted. The purpose of using the eTVRA is
to be able to identify vulnerabilities that exist in the system.
Therefore, after identifying assets and their vulnerabilities,
threats that exploit those vulnerabilities and cause incidents
are determined. The security requirements and the threats
are then extended according to threats and vulnerabilities.
Then, the occurrence likelihood of the threats and their im-
pact is analyzed and quantified. This is used in the follow-
ing step to calculate the risk. Consequently, the counter-
measures for treating the risk are identified. This process is
applied iteratively, until the risk of unwanted incidents is re-
duced to an acceptable level, or whenever there are changes
in the environment [16].
eTVRA encapsulates the relevant parts of Common Cri-
teria and aims at producing high-quality input to a Com-
mon Criteria Security Evaluation. Below we provide more
details on this.
eTVRA is developed mainly for security standardization.
Therefore, it considers only the technical vulnerabilities and
countermeasures: the business impact of security breaches
is as usual outside the scope of the standards.
2.3. Value Webs
A value-web [5] consists of a set of profit and loss re-
sponsible actors that cooperate to realize a common goal.
The actors can be independent companies or even business
units of an holding. A value-web produces either a product
or a service of some value. Some of the most commonly
build value-webs are marriages, outsourcing, insurance and
contractor relationships.
The main challenge of constructing and protecting value-
webs is that the web should be profitable for each of the
actors.
To evaluate the effects of value-webs on a risk assess-
ment, the following evaluation criteria should be consid-
ered: (1) goal of each actor, (2) available resources, (3)
confidentiality of business critical information, (4) commu-
nication of confidential information, and (5) coordination of
the responsibilities of the actors.
3. Industrial context
The industrial context in this paper consists of two Eu-
ropean companies, which collaborate as a value-web in
the Telco domain. Together, they have developed the
world’s first GSM SIM card with embedded radio capabil-
ities (802.11b). The two companies are a small hardware
producer, which is new to the Telco market, and a large
European Telco provider that is already a major player in
the field. The distribution of responsibility within the de-
velopment project is that the hardware producer designs
and produces the (Integrated Circuit) IC technology and its
firmware, while the large Telco company implements the
software layer between the firmware and the operating sys-
tem (OS) as well as the value-added service running on top
of the OS.
One of the possible application areas for this new SIM
card is automatic meter reading (AMR). AMR refers to the
technology used for automatically collecting data from me-
tering devices (e.g. water, gas, and electricity) and trans-
ferring readings to a central database for billing and anal-
ysis. In this context, a SIM card with wireless capabilities
will reduce the number of terminals necessary to report the
readings, hence saving a substantial amount of money. To
limit the scope of the assessment and to make it feasible
to do an evaluation between eTVRA and a checklist-based
approach, we focused on the security of the new SIM tech-
nology in the context of AMR and on how to produce high-
quality input to a future Common Criteria evaluation.
4. Methodology
We evaluated the efficiency and result quality of two risk
assessment approaches; (1) extended eTVRA and (2) Pro-
tection Profile-based checklists, as input to Common Cri-
teria security evaluation. Here, we describe the two ap-
proaches and document the changes we made to eTVRA
and the risk identification and risk analysis methods that we
used to support the relevant activities of eTVRA, as eTVRA
does not give concrete guidelines as such.
Fig. 3 gives an overview of the extended eTVRA. The
main changes we made consist in adding the context identi-
fication step taken from CORAS as well as concrete guide-
lines for methodologies to use for risk identification and risk
analysis. The figure illustrates, besides the process flow, the
information we used as input to the different steps involved,
the information delivered as output of the steps and the
methodologies that we used as support in producing the out-
puts. The extensions made to eTVRA come as a response to
the deficiencies of eTVRA that are identified during earlier
case studies.
4.1. Step 1: Context Identification
Earlier case studies of eTVRA at ETSI have shown that
“context identification” is critical for producing more pre-
cise results. As eTVRA does not include any specific con-
text identification activities, we extended eTVRA with the
context identification sub-process of CORAS. The aim of
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Figure 3. Extended eTVRA and the supporting methodologies that we used with input and output
documents.
this sub-process is to describe the IT product to be assessed
and its environment.
We used a Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities and
Threats (SWOT) analysis [6] as information gathering tool
to identify the scope of the risk assessment and to ensure
that the two stakeholders involved agreed on the goal and
the objective of the assessment.
To prepare for and to carry out an effective SWOT ses-
sion we referred to the case scenario documentation. Then,
we (the risk analysts), together with the product owner (the
two stakeholders in the value-web), went through the cur-
rent case scenario document and made sure that we had a
common understanding of the assessment context and of the
role of the SIM card in an AMR setting.
The SWOT analysis helped us to determine the scope
of the assessment and to focus the following assessment
activities. In addition to SWOT, we carried out semi-
structured interviews with both stakeholders. During the
semi-structured interviews we agreed with the stakeholders
on the functional components of the AMR deployment sce-
nario which we previously extracted from the case scenario
documentation.
The result of this step is documented in a context identi-
fication document, which consisted of the case description
(including the deployment scenario), the functional compo-
nents, the reference architecture and the scope of the assess-
ment.
4.2. Step 2: Security Objective and Re-
quirement Identification
The first step of eTVRA is the specification of security
objectives and the identification of security requirements.
From this step on, we used the eTVRA process as described
in [17].
To establish the security objectives we based ourselves
on the output of the previous step; namely the SWOT-
Analysis and the semi-structured interviews, as reported in
the context identification document.
We divided the security objectives of the new SIM tech-
nology into security objectives of the assets and security ob-
jectives of the environment. We then combined them and
defined new security objectives for the desired level of con-
fidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication and autho-
rization for the assets involved.
These security objectives were high-level, e.g. “The new
SIM technology should ensure continuous and correct oper-
ation of its core functionality and availability to authorized
use upon request.”, so for operability reasons they had to be
refined into security requirements. Security requirements
describe the details of how the security objective will be
achieved.
We listed the security objectives in a Target of Evaluation
(ToE) document. At that time we did not have enough infor-
mation to detail security requirements, so we postponed this
activity to a further step. This document was then extended
with the context identification descriptions from the previ-
ous step and given to the two stakeholders for approval.
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4.3. Step 3: Asset Inventory
In this step we used the information gathered in Step 1
and 2 as input. First, we had to complete the draft-list of
assets that came out of the semi-structural interviews with
the two stakeholders as described in Section 4.1.
For the interview with the large Telco company we used
the reference architecture as input and we obtained a list of
assets relevant for the information flow in the AMR case.
These were assets at a high-level of abstraction (e.g. the
concentrator functionality on the SIM card).
The interview with the hardware developer was carried
out as a functional architecture walk-through. This resulted
in assets on the physical and logical layer. We then com-
pared these assets with the information flow assets and mod-
eled their internal relations (e.g. dependency and contain-
ment relationships). The result of this activity was given as
output of Step 3.
4.4. Step 4: Threat and Vulnerability Iden-
tification
eTVRA includes activities to identify threats and vul-
nerabilities but does not provide how-to guidelines (i.e. it
does not provide any method/tool to systematically extract
threats and vulnerabilities). We therefore used the guide-
lines provided in CORAS to assist us in Step 4. In partic-
ular, we used Security-HazOp [23] (in CORAS Security-
HazOp is referred to as HazOp) and Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) [15].
Security-HazOp
A Hazard and Operability (HazOp) study [3] is a system-
atic analysis of how deviations from intended use of system
components can arise, and whether these deviations can re-
sult in hazards. A hazard is defined in FAA Order 8040.4
[22] as a “Condition, event, or circumstance that could lead
to or contribute to an unplanned or undesirable event.”
Although HazOp has been developed for safety rather
than security, i.e. for industrial processes, notably the chem-
ical, petrochemical and nuclear industries, experiences over
the years have shown that the basic principle is applica-
ble in different contexts, such as systems containing pro-
grammable electronics [9]. Security-HazOp [23] is a secu-
rity specific refinement of HazOp which includes security
specific constructs.
In general, HazOp is performed by defining a set of
guide-words and attributes and combining them with each
other. The result can be used to describe generic deviations
which help in identifying specific safety related deviations.
Security-HazOp differs from HazOp in the chosen guide-
words and attributes.
Srivatanakul et al. [21] criticize Security-HazOp and
claim that the recommended guidewords are not flexible
enough to bring out the analysts’ creativity. They propose to
apply guidewords to elements of a case by interpreting the
guidewords for the attributes of each element of the case
that is subject to deviation.
Furthermore, we took some of the recommendations
given in CORAS for Security-HazOp and used as input the
high-level threats and vulnerabilities discovered during the
SWOT-Analysis and from relevant Smart Card Protection
Profile [8].
By determining and associating the guidewords we used
the following approach. First, we listed the actors, asso-
ciations and elements of the AMR case. Second, we con-
structed a list of guidewords for the attributes of each of
these main elements, as recommended by Srivatanakul for
increasing the creativity of the analyst. Third, consider-
ing that more than one guideword may apply to an asset
at one time, we grouped the guidewords as pre-guide-words
and post-guide-words as recommenced in Security-HazOp.
Last, we used the following notation to generate possible se-
curity incidents: <pre-guideword> <attribute>
of <component> due to <post-guideword>. In
this notation, Pre-Guidewords are the possible causes of in-
adequate security attributes, e.g. deliberate, unintentional.
Attributes are obtained by negating the security objec-
tives, e.g. manipulation, denial and disclosure. Components
are physical and information assets; and Post-guide-words
are the possible threats, e.g. technical failure or outsider.
In this way, we obtained a list of 5400 possible incidents,
e.g. “Deliberate disclosure of meter readings due to tech-
nical failure”. As it is not time and resource efficient to
cover all of these incident in one HazOp-session, we pre-
processed and eliminated impossible incidents using the se-
curity objectives identified in Step 2 as filter. The incidents
space sub-set derived from this consisted of 88 possible in-
cidents.
We organized two structured brainstorming sessions: (i)
one session with the large Telco company and (ii) one ses-
sion with both stakeholders. During these HazOp sessions,
the RA-leader moderated the debate by using a set of “fault-
statements” derived from the incident sub-set, e.g. un-
sorted “How is it possible to deliberate disclose meter read-
ings due to technical failure?”, to motivate the attendees
to structured thinking. In all cases where potential hazards
were detected, the RA leader followed up by asking ques-
tions directed towards gathering information on its likeli-
hood and its potential business impacts. Furthermore, to
brighten the perspective of the attendees but remain passive
in generating threats, we also used a light-weight role-play.
The output of Step 4 was an unstructured list of vulnera-
bilities, threats and potential security incidents.
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4.5. Step 5: Incident Documentation
The list produced in Step 4 was taken as input to Step 5,
where the list was structured in terms of cause-consequence
relationships. We used FTA [15] to support us in this activ-
ity.
FTA
According to [14], a “fault” is an abnormal condition that
may cause a reduction in, or loss of, the capability of a func-
tional unit to perform a required function. FTA is a sys-
tem engineering method, which is mainly used in the safety
domain. It represents, from the system point of view, the
logical combinations of various system states, faults, and
possible causes which can contribute to a top event (speci-
fied event). Security techniques, such as Threat Trees and
Attack Trees originates from FTA [15].
We used the Fault Trees to illustrate at high-level threat-
vulnerability pairs. Furthermore, we linked the incidents to
each other with respect to their dependencies, e.g., if an in-
cident a is a precondition for an incident b then we inserted
incident a below incident b and indicated the relation with
an arrow. Moreover, we differentiated between AND and
OR causal relations.
Finally, we communicated the fault tree and the derived
incident scenarios to the asset owners. The goal of this ac-
tivity was to communicate and consolidate our findings and
to gather additional information on the likelihood and con-
sequence evaluation.
Currently, we are in the process of gathering likelihood
and consequence of the identified threats. This activity is
carried out by the two stakeholders in the value-web. The
remaining processes (Steps 5, 6 and 7 of eTVRA) are go-
ing to be carried out when the likelihood and consequence
evaluation is finished at the end of 2008.
5. Alternative methodology: Security Check-
lists from SmartCard Protection Profiles
In parallel to analyzing risks according to the extended
eTVRA, we employed a more pragmatic (i.e. less time con-
suming) approach. We call this the PP-based approach or
the security checklist from relevant PPs. This approach
requires almost no interaction with the main stakehold-
ers for threat identification as the possible threats are ex-
tracted from an existing Common Criteria PP for
SmartCards [8]. The approach consists of four steps:
1. Description of the risk assessment object and its secu-
rity environment.
2. Specification of the security functional requirements.
3. Identification of the threat-vulnerability pairs and their
impact.
4. Risk analysis, prioritization and documentation.
Steps 1 and 2
Step 1 of this approach is similar to Step 1 of the ex-
tended eTVRA described in the previous section.
The security environment of the new SIM card for the
AMR scenario includes (1) the assets to be protected and
(2) the threat agents with their abilities to reach and exploit
the assessment object or/and its environment during a rea-
sonable product life-time (which is from product release to
major natural update). To describe the security environment
in this approach, we used the documentation provided in
Step 1 of the extended eTVRA. According to the results
of the semi-structured interviews, we classified the com-
ponents of the new SIM card in the context of the AMR
scenario into physical and logical components. We further
classified physical components according to how they inter-
act with the external environment (e.g. wireless connection,
serial connection, etc.). This classification is useful to clar-
ify the main attack points of each component (e.g. a certain
component may be attacked only through the wireless inter-
face).
Step 3
The third step in this approach is performed off-line, that
is without interacting with the stakeholders.
We made a selection of the threats enumerated in the rel-
evant Common Criteria PP [8]. The selection criteria we
adopted were based on: (i) whether the threat agent fits in
the usage scope of the new SIM card (e.g. terrorism is not a
credible threat agent for the AMR scenario) and (ii) whether
the threat can be perpetrated by means of the components
of the new SIM card (i.e. if it exists a component in the
new SIM card which can be targeted by the threat). As the
new SIM card also contains several components which are
not part of a standard SmartCard (e.g. a wireless interface),
the threat list provided in [8] covers only partly the range
of possible threats. To fill this gap we included additional
threats collected during a literature search [4, 12, 2, 20, 7].
Following [8] threats are characterized by a threat agent,
a threat scenario, a set of vulnerabilities enabling the threat
and one or more assets targeted by the threat. The threat list
can be summarized as follows:
• Threats associated with physical attacks
• Threats associated with logical attacks
• Threats associated with access control
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• Threats associated with unanticipated interactions
• Threats regarding cryptographic functions
• Threats of information monitoring
• Threats addressed by the operating environment
• Miscellaneous threats
To be able to build a hierarchy among the threats, which
in turn is needed to prioritize threats in the fourth step of
this approach, we additionally grouped threats according
to the relevant security properties confidentiality, integrity
and availability. The five resulting threat categories are:
(1) unauthorized disclosure of assets, (2) theft or unautho-
rized use of assets, (3) unauthorized modification of assets,
(4) unauthorized disclosure of assets and (5) unauthorized
modification of assets.
Step 4
Step four is concerned with calculating the risk level of
the threats and thereby prioritizing risks. The list of prior-
itized risks was submitted to the main stakeholders as an
addition to the earlier described ToE document. (This step
has not been finalized yet.)
6. Comparison of the two approaches
The main goal of the risk assessment for both stakehold-
ers in the value-web was to produce information that could
be used, preferably directly, as input to a Common Criteria
evaluation. This puts some constraints on the expected out-
come of the risk assessment, and influenced how we carried
out some of the steps of the extended eTVRA. This is also
the reason why we decided to compare eTVRA with a more
pragmatic approach of security checklists derived from ex-
isting Protection Profiles (PP).
Figure 4. ST/ToE and ST/PP activity chart.
Common Criteria recognizes two types of evaluations:
(1) ST/ToE evaluation and (2) ST/PP evaluation. ST de-
notes the Security Target. In case of an ST/ToE evalua-
tion, specific parts of the concrete IT product are defined
into a Target of Evaluation (ToE). On the other hand, PP
is an implementation-independent version of a particular IT
product type, such as SmartCards. This means that a PP can
be looked upon as a template for a type of IT products. Fig-
ure 4 shows the different activities involved when carrying
out ST/ToE and ST/PP evaluations. The two types of eval-
uations are not orthogonal as the output of ST/PP can serve
as input for ST/ToE.
To enable reuse, Common Criteria offers a registry
where IT product owners can chose to store documents from
successful PP or ST/ToE evaluation. It is from the PP reg-
istry that we found the SmartCards PPs that we used for
the alternative methodology (PP-based methodology) de-
scribed in the previous section.
In our case, the goal is to assess the ST/ToE to reach
EAL 4 or 4+. Ideally, if the SmartCard PP [8] covered
all aspects of our IT product, it could have been used as
a template to produce the ST/ToE documents of the object
in question. However, as one always has to produce the ST-
part and as the ST is ToE dependent, there is always at least
some adaptation work needed, also in our case. To inves-
tigate the amount of adaptation work and the quality of the
output produced, we performed a structured evaluation of
the distance between the results produced and the needed
input for an ST/ToE evaluation. This evaluation was done
for both methodologies. Before we discuss the result of this
evaluation, we list the ST/ToE requirements, which we use
as evaluation criteria.
According to Common Criteria Part 1 [10], the manda-
tory content of an ST/ToE is the following:
• ST introduction, containing three narrative descrip-
tions of the ToE on different levels of abstraction.
• Conformance claim, showing whether the ST claims
conformance to any PPs and/or packages (e.g. threat
lists), and if so, to which.
• Security problem definition, showing the threats, secu-
rity policies and assumptions that must be countered,
enforced and upheld by the ToE and its operational en-
vironment (also referred to as security environment).
• Security objective, which includes the security objec-
tives for the ToE and the security objectives for the
operational environment of the ToE.
• Extended components definition, where new compo-
nents (i.e. not included in Common Criteria Part
2 [10] or Common Criteria Part 3 [10]) may be defined.
These new components are needed to define extended
functional and extended assurance requirements.
• Security requirements, where a translation of the secu-
rity objectives for the ToE into a standardized language
is provided. That is, standardized according to the rec-
ommendations in Common Criteria: security require-
ments should clearly specify the security functions, to
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a level where it is possible to directly check that these
security functions are actually implemented as speci-
fied and to argue that they fulfill the security objective
they address.
• ToE summary specification, showing how the security
functions specified are implemented in the ToE.
The PP-based approach (described in Section 5) pro-
duced a checklist of threat categories relevant for Smart-
Cards. In addition, we added threat categories relevant for
the wireless interface. Provided that the chosen PP has a
good coverage of the IT product (new SIM card in the con-
text of the ARM scenario), this approach should reduce at
least the time, the resources and possibly the cost needed
to produce high quality results in terms of usable input to
ST/ToE evaluation according to Common Criteria EAL 4
and 4+. The same can be said for the extended eTVRA, as
it has been developed and tailored to produce information
directly usable as input to a ST/ToE evaluation, except for
the EAL level. However, which of the two approaches is
more efficient (that is, offers an more efficient underlying
process) and which produces the highest quality result in
terms of coverage and match to the ST/ToE evaluation in-
formation requirements is not clear and will be examined in
the sequel. Note that we do not discuss the quality of the re-
sult in terms of is ability to pass an EAL 4 or 4+ evaluation,
as the evaluation has not been performed yet.
6.1. Evaluation of result quality for the PP-
based approach
To simplify the evaluation of the PP-based approach, we
assumed full coverage and relevance for our IT-product. A
PP document has the same basic structure as a ST/ToE doc-
ument. However, the PP introduction is narrative and does
not provide the information necessary for a ST/ToE intro-
duction. Thus, this part had to be completely re-written in
the form. For the remaining parts, we had to add infor-
mation for the wireless interface and to tailor the contents
of the PP document to fit our IT product. We did so by
adding new parts and by re-formulating text for the confor-
mance claim, the security problem definition, the security
objectives, the extended components definition, and the se-
curity requirements. As a PP document does not include a
ToE summary specification, this part had to be made from
scratch. We could reuse a substantial amount of the existing
PP text (about 40%) and we also got help in putting together
the security controls necessary for the new SIM card.
We believe that this result holds in general whenever
there is a close match between an existing PP and the IT
product. Therefore, if those conditions are met, it is more
time and resource efficient to follow the alternative ap-
proach described in Section 5. Otherwise the PP-based
Table 1. Comparison of the methodologies
Extended eTVRA PP-based approach
KPI(1): n. of threats 77 48
KPI(2): n. of abstraction layers 6 2
KPI(3): man-hours employed 310 68
KPI(4): re-written chapters of
CC certification document 6/7 2/7
approach is not more efficient that extended eTVRA. We
based this last consideration on the experience we gained
from the AMR case study, without a formal evaluation. In
addition, the PP-based approach did not identify any of the
added security challenges (e.g. the public key functionali-
ties or the key management protocol issues) which needed
extra attention from the management perspective, as the
roles of the two actors were not clearly defined.
6.2. Evaluation of result quality for the ex-
tended eTVRA
The extended eTVRA produced most of the underlying
information needed for the ST/ToE document. However, the
output had to be re-formulated to fit the ST/ToE document
requirements. Step 1 of extended eTVRA produced the goal
and scope statements, which could easily be reused in a
ST/ToE evaluation. Furthermore, it also identified which
EAL to target and the ToE boundaries, that is, which parts
of the IT product were in the scope. The SWOT and the
semi-structured interviews in Step 1 also brought to light
cross-organizational challenges due to the value-web con-
figuration. Finally, the ToE document in Section 4.1, pro-
duced as output from Step 1, is at a level that made it easy
to formulate the necessary ToE abstraction levels required
for the ST/ToE introduction.
6.3. Summary of evaluation results
To summarize, the extended eTVRA produced richer in-
formation, but the output was not as tailored and directly
reusable as that produced by the PP-based approach. How-
ever, we identified more threats using the extended eTVRA.
To make a comparison which encompassed both the result
quality and process efficiency, we identified four Key Per-
formance Indicators (KPIs): (i) number of relevant threats
identified during the risk assessment, (ii) number of abstrac-
tion layers in the threat hierarchy built during the risk as-
sessment, (iii) number of man-hours employed to carry out
the risk assessment and (iv) number of re-written chapters
of CC certification document. KPIs (i) and (ii) express the
quality of the results in terms of result quality and result pre-
sentation quality, while KPI (iii) and (iv) measures the effi-
ciency of the underlying process of each approach in terms
of invested resources during the assessment and for elabo-
137
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITEIT TWENTE. Downloaded on May 19,2010 at 07:59:03 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
rating the results of the assessment. Table 1 summarizes the
methodology comparison.
By calculating the KPI (iii) we assumed a working day of
8 hours. Furthermore, the chapters of CC certification doc-
ument are respective to the mandatory content of an ST/ToE
presented in Section 6.
The results of the comparison indicates that a risk assess-
ment following the extended eTVRA delivers better results
(∼37%) than the PP-based approach in that it produces a
richer and more product-specific result. The main reason for
this is that by using the extended eTVRA, and the support-
ing risk identification and analysis methods as described in
Section 4, we can benefit of the creativity of the risk analyst
and the stakeholders involved. This most often means that
the risk identification is attacked from several viewpoints.
Moreover, in the presentation of the results produced
from the PP-approach we only used two levels of abstrac-
tion. This is in contrast with the six-layer incident hierar-
chy resulting from the extended eTVRA. In general, hav-
ing more layers is not always beneficial. However, for the
critical components of an IT product, more layers ease the
evaluation job of the Common Criteria evaluator: the six
layers in the fault tree gives a deeper knowledge into how
incidents may arise and thus also in how incidents can be
prevented. On the other hand, such detailed results may not
be necessary for less critical components or assets and is
both time and resource demanding. At present, there is no
consensus on when a richer layer is beneficial.
Considering the time spent on identifying threats, the
PP-based approach is five times more efficient than the ex-
tended eTVRA methodology. This makes the former more
favorable than the latter in cases where time, resources and
budget are limited or when the market window is relatively
short in time. Additional instructions in which the PP-
approach works better is, when a limited ST/ToE is suf-
ficient (only small parts of the IT product are evaluated),
when targeting a low EAL (EAL 2 or 3) or when the PP
is not used to support a ST/ToE evaluation but merely as
domain knowledge.
What should also be noted is the effort spend to adapt
the methodologies to cover the mandatory contents of an
ST/ToE according to Common Criteria Part 1, which is in-
dicated with KPI (iv). As the Extended eTVRA allocates
only the “ST introduction” and “Security Problem Defini-
tion” Chapters, the PP-based approach requires re-writing
only the “ST introduction” and “ToE Summary Specifica-
tion” Chapters. Hence, the latter requires three time less
re-writing, and is therefore, more result oriented.
7. Lessons Learned
The lessons learnt from the AMR case are many. They
are both related to the result quality and process efficiency
as discussed in the previous section and to how the extended
eTVRA enables the communication needed in each step and
whether it produced the information required as input for
the next step in the methodology. This is particularly chal-
lenging in a value-web context. We have discussed the for-
mer in the previous section, so here we report on (i) com-
munication and (ii) information on a value-web context.
7.1. Communication
The industrial context with two relatively different com-
panies collaborating in a value web affected the quality
of the communication throughout the assessment. One of
the companies was a relatively small hardware producer
new on the Telco market. Its goals with the development
project was thus naturally rather different than that of the
second stakeholder: the large Telco company. A small com-
pany usually has limited monetary and human resources and
when such a company is new to a market, the essence is to
produce a good quality product and to get penetration in the
new domain. A big international player with many years
in the market could care less about time and market pen-
etration issues, as it does not depend on a single product
for market visibility and cash flow. However, the two stake-
holders have a common goal in the development project and
that is to produce a high quality product.
We experienced some communication difficulties that
we believe are due to the configuration of the value-web.
First, it seems that there was no clear agreements, neither
internal to each stakeholder or across the two organiza-
tions, regarding which information was company internal,
company confidential or open to everybody involved in the
value-web. This made it somewhat challenging to carry out
assessment sessions where both stakeholders were involved.
Also, the distribution of assignments within the develop-
ment project seemed to have been shifted a bit since the
start-up of the project due to technical difficulties.
We also experienced that it was much easier to get the
communication flowing when interacting with each stake-
holder separately, than it was in sessions where both were
present. This could be due to the tight deadline phase that
the project was in at the time of the assessment, but it could
also be a general observation that is valid outside of the
AMR case.
What worked well were the semi-structured interviews in
Step 1 of the extended eTVRA and the separately executed
risk identification sessions in Step 3. The common brain-
storming sessions was less successful. We have identified
two main reasons for this: (i) unspoken communication re-
strictions and (ii) possible unsuitability of Security-HazOp
for risk identification in a value-web context.
Un-spoken communication restrictions refer to the first
evaluation criteria listed in Section 2.3. Both stakeholders
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had unspoken goals and expectations, that out of strategic
reasons where kept hidden even though they would help
clarifying some of the security challenges that were dis-
cussed.
Additional communication difficulties arose from poor
management of tacit knowledge, and poor alignment be-
tween own vision of role and others’ expectations [19]. This
is further explored in Section 7.2.
When it comes to Security-HazOp and whether the
method is efficient for risk identification in a value-web
context, we made some observations that deserve further
investigation. In particular, brainstorming sessions with all
involved stakeholders were not effective due to the reasons
mentioned above: hidden goals, assumptions and expecta-
tions. However, we believe it should be possible to adapt
Security-HazOp to allow tacit information to be revealed in
a non-threatening manner so that relevant stakeholders do
not feel unconformable. Furthermore, confidential infor-
mation should always remain secret, even if its disclosure
is in the best interest of the project. We believe this issue
deserves further investigation before any conclusion can be
drawn.
7.2. Information
Information is crucial for the quality of risk assessment
results and for the efficiency of risk assessment methodolo-
gies. If information is missing or if there are problems in
interpreting it, the results produced will be poor.
As always in development projects, not much informa-
tion is available in the early stages of the development.
That was also true for the AMR case. In particular, in-
formation is often not made explicit at these early stages
and people are not often aware of the knowledge they pos-
sess or how it can be valuable to others. Tacit knowledge
is considered more valuable because it provides context for
people, places, ideas, and experiences. Effective transfer of
tacit knowledge generally requires extensive personal con-
tact and trust. For risk management it is necessary to gain
some understanding of the deployment scenarios to make
security decisions, so it is important to extract the hidden
knowledge.
In the AMR case, we extracted tacit knowledge through
the semi-structural interviews. That is, we first made
guesses based on the scarce information available and then
asked the stakeholders their opinion on our guesses as a
kick-off for the semi-structured interview. Then we tried to
use the stakeholders feedback to structure our own thoughts
and to arrive at a preliminary understanding of the intended
behavior and deployment of the new SIM card for the AMR
scenario.
The reference architecture and the functional compo-
nents of the new SIM card that was given us during Step
1 of the extended eTVRA methodology is an example of
implicit information. The diagram in itself did not give the
risk analysts much information, as they did not have the
required domain knowledge. The added information given
in the semi-structured interview ensured that the diagram
made sense, and could be used to articulate the security
objectives. In a similar manner, we used at Step 4 of the
extended eTVRA methodology the list of assets combined
with our knowledge about the information flow to trans-
fer the implicit knowledge on the threats and vulnerabilities
into explicit knowledge.
8. Conclusions
This paper presented an extension of eTVRA and com-
pared it with a more pragmatic PP-based approach on a con-
crete test-case as tools for producing quality results for a
ST/ToE Common Criteria evaluation. The two approaches
were evaluated in terms of result quality and process effi-
ciency. The result of the evaluation is that if a suitable PP
exists and if the ToE has a rather limited scope, the PP-
based approach is at least more time effective, maybe also
more resource and cost effective. However, it produces a
more narrative result than that of the extended eTVRA ap-
proach. We argue that which of the two approaches is more
suitable for a particular case depends on the goal of the risk
assessment and possibly on the targeted EAL in case of a
ST/ToE evaluation.
We have extended eTVRA with a context identification
step. The decision on this extension was based on previ-
ous experience with eTVRA in which we show that without
context definition it is hard to keep threat identification ses-
sions, and in particular brainstorming sessions, targeted and
focused.
We also extended eTVRA with methodology recommen-
dations for threat identification and incident documentation
borrowed from Security-HazOp and FTA. Security-HazOp
is a security specific adoption of HazOp, which has been in
use in the safety domain for several decades. HazOp is well
tested and well structured and, when adequate guide-words
are selected, proved to be an effective threat identification
brainstorming tool. The same can be said for FTA, which
showed to produce an adequate set of abstraction levels.
Future work includes finalizing the risk assessment of
the new SIM card in the context of the AMR scenario, carry
out more risk assessments using the extended eTVRA to get
a better overview of the efficiency of the underlying process
of the methodology and to give more detailed recommen-
dations on how to produce high-quality results. The latter
refers to the degree that the output can be used directly in
a ST/ToE document for a ST/ToE evaluation according to
Common Criteria. We also plan to investigate how value-
webs introduce challenges in risk assessments and how con-
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tracts can be used to cope with them.
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